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1 Introduction
In 1981 Magill [12] explored existence of optimal strategies in linear multisector models
when time is continuous and the preferences of the representative agent are characterized
by two parameters: the rate of time discount ρ and the constant elasticity of substitution
σ > 0, within a more general formulation in which technology is not necessarily linear.
He proved ([12], Theorem 9.15, p. 703) that in a von Neumann technology with constant
returns if
Γ0 >
Γ0 − ρ
σ
,
then an optimal strategy exists, where Γ0 is the maximum rate of growth (Magill [12] did
not provide any non-existence results; but see [13]). However Magill used an assumption
on ”regularity” ([12], Assumption T.2, p. 703) justified on the basis of the Gale [9] inde-
composability assumption implying that the upper bound of the uniform over time rates
of reproduction of any commodity equals the maximum rate of growth.
In a more recent paper, Freni et alii [7] analyzed in greater depth the existence of
optimal strategies in linear multisector models when time is continuous and proved, on
the assumption that only one commodity is consumed, that if
Γ1 >
Γ1 − ρ
σ
,
then an optimal strategy exists, whereas if
Γ1 <
Γ1 − ρ
σ
,
then no optimal strategy exists, where Γ1 is the upper bound of the uniform over time
rate of reproduction of commodity 1, which is the only commodity which is consumed.
Freni et alii [7] also considered the case in which
Γ1 =
Γ1 − ρ
σ
,
and provided further results of the existence or non existence according to the size of σ.
Therefore what matters is not the maximum rate of growth, but the upper bound of the
uniform over time rates of reproduction of the consumption good if only one commodity
is consumed. In this paper we aim to generalize this result to the case in which several
consumption goods exist. More precisely we will prove that if
Γν >
Γν − ρ
σ
, (1)
then an optimal strategy exists, whereas if
Γν <
Γν − ρ
σ
, (2)
then no optimal strategy exists, where Γν is an average of the upper bounds of the uniform
over time rates of reproduction of consumption commodities. Finding the right definition
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of the average Γν and studying its properties was indeed the main technical difficulty
of the paper. The average Γν is defined by the instantaneous utility function only and
is totally independent of technology whereas the upper bound of the uniform over time
rate of reproduction of a commodity depends only on technology and is independent of
consumer preferences.1
Our result depends on the fact that the instantaneous utility function has two prop-
erties: (a) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is constant over time and (b) pref-
erences are concave and homothetic. Hence the instantaneous utility function uσ depends
on a parameter σ > 0 (the elasticity of substitution) and is given by
uσ (ν) =
ν1−σ−1
1−σ for σ > 0, σ 6= 1
u1 (ν) = log ν for σ = 1
(3)
(with the agreement that uσ(0) = −∞ for σ ≥ 1), where ν : Rk+ → R is continuous,
increasing on every component, concave, and homogeneous. With no loss of generality we
assume that ν is homogeneous of degree 1. The assumption of homothetic preferences is
justified by the fact that otherwise income distribution among consumers matters and, as
a consequence, it would be appropriate to avoid an analysis in terms of a representative
agent. However, if nonhomothetic preferences are modelled through Stone-Geary utility
functions, as in Kongsamut et al. [11], then results similar to those presented here can be
obtained.
The analysis presented here is most relevant when the upper bound of the uniform
over-time rates of reproduction of different consumption goods are not equal (because of
decomposability of technology). This analysis introduces the possibility of investigating
structural change in relation to the different growth rates Γi and their average Γν found
here. Structural change, mainly in exogenous growth models, is an increasingly widely
studied issue in the literature: see [17] and [1]. The fact that the average defined here
Γν depends on the instantaneous utility function alone and is wholly independent of
technology suggests that such an average should emerge even in different analytic contexts
in which technology is not linear and inequalities among growth rates are not related to
the decomposability of technology.
From the technical point of view the results obtained in this paper can be seen as
generalizations of those obtained elsewhere [7]. Indeed, while some preliminary Lemmas
(see e.g. Lemma 4.1) are straightforward extensions of results contained in [7], the technical
core of the present paper needs new ideas and techniques to be dealt with. The main
reason is the fact that as we want to find “sharp” results (i.e. existence when (1) holds
and nonexistence when (2) holds), we have to understand precisely the role of the function
ν in the existence of optimal trajectories. It would be very easy to extend the result of
the paper [7] and find only rough sufficient conditions for the existence (e.g. substituting
Γν with the maximum of the Γi’s) and for the non-existence (e.g. substituting Γν with
the minimum of the Γi’s). But to get our sharp results we need to understand what is
1We consider also the case in which Γν = Γν−ρσ , and provide further results of existence or non
existence.
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the right average, and then carefully prove all the various estimates needed for existence
and nonexistence. For this reason these estimates, as happens for all sharp estimates, are
structurally different from those needed when there is only one consumption good.
The paper is structured as follows: first we describe the model and assess the main
assumptions in Section 2. In Section 3 we enunciate the main results and provide examples
to show the complexity of the limiting cases. Section 4 is devoted to proving the main
results. Finally the Appendix aims to prove some useful results concerning the average
Γν .
2 The Model
There are n ≥ 1 commodities, and k of them are consumed, say commodities 1, . . . , k.
Preferences with respect to consumption over time are such that they can be described by
a single intertemporal utility function Uσ, which is the usual C.E.S. (Constant Elasticity
of Substitution) function: for a given consumption path c : [0,+∞) → Rk, (ct ≥ 0 a.e.),
we set
Uσ (c (·)) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρtuσ (ν(c (t))) dt (4)
where ρ ∈ R is the rate of time discount of the representative agent, and the instantaneous
utility function uσ : [0,+∞)→ R∪{−∞} has the form (3) and ν : Rk+ → R is continuous,
increasing on every component, concave, and homogeneous of degree 1. Possible examples
of function ν are the following:
ν(c) = cα11 c
α2
2 · · · cαkk , αi ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, . . . k,
k∑
i=1
αi = 1 (5)
ν(c) = min {α1c1, α2c2, . . . , αkck} , αi ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, . . . k,
k∑
i=1
αi = 1 (6)
ν(c) = α1c1 + α2c2 + · · ·+ αkck, αi ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, . . . k,
k∑
i=1
αi = 1 (7)
ν(c) = {α1cq1 +α2cq2 + · · ·+αkcqk}1/q, αi ∈ (0, 1), i = 1, . . . k,
k∑
i=1
αi = 1, q < 1. (8)
In the first case preferences are Cobb-Douglas, in the second consumed commodities are
perfect complements, in the third consumed commodities are perfect substitutes, in the
fourth preferences are CES.
For the sake of simplicity we will drop the additive constant − (1− σ)−1 in the fol-
lowing since this will not affect the optimal paths.
Technology is fully described by a pair of nonnegative matrices (the m× n material
input matrix A and the m× n material output matrix B, m ≥ 0) and by a uniform rate
of depreciation δx of capital goods used for production. The rate of depreciation for goods
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not employed in production is δz. If m = 0, we say that matrices A and B are void. In
this degenerate case production does not hold and all capital goods decay at rate δz: the
model reduces to the standard one-dimensional AK model with A = −δz ≤ 0.
The amounts of commodities available as capital at time t are defined by the vector
st. They may be either used for production (if m > 0) or disposed of. That is
sTt = x
T
t A + z
T
t ,
where x ≥ 0 denotes the vector of the intensities of operation and z ≥ 0 the vector of the
amounts of goods which are disposed of. Production consists in combining the productive
services from the stocks to generate flows that add to the existing stocks. Decay and
consumption, on the other hand, drain away the stocks:
s˙Tt = x
T
t [B− δxA]− δzzTt − cˆTt ; cˆt ≥ 0 s0 = s¯
where cˆt is the n × 1 vector obtained from the k × 1 consumption vector ct and adding
a zero component for each pure capital good at places k + 1, . . . , n. By eliminating the
variable z and setting δ = −δz + δx, we obtain
s˙Tt = x
T
t [B− δA]− δzsTt − cˆTt ; (9)
with the initial condition
s0 = s¯ ≥ 0 (10)
and the constraints
xt ≥ 0, sTt ≥ xTt A, ct ≥ 0. (11)
If we also add the constraint
xTt B ≥ cˆTt (12)
the proof of existence here provided would be simplified since the constraint (12) would
imply that the set of admissible control strategies is relatively compact in the space of
integrable functions with a suitable weight. As a consequence a simpler procedure to prove
existence could be used (see Remark 4.4 after the proof of Lemma 4.2). The economic
interpretation of the constraint (12) is the following: commodities which in principle can
be used both as consumption and as capital (the first k commodities in our case) cannot
be converted to consumption once they are installed as capital. One of the aims of this
paper is to show that a constraint of this type is not needed.2
Our problem is then to maximize the intertemporal utility (4) over all production-
consumption strategies (x, c) that satisfy the constraints (9), (10) and (11). This is an
2On the contrary, constraints of this type are used by Magill [12], Becker et alii [4], and Balder [2]. In
[12], Definition 4.1 and Assumption 1, p. 686 (then in Section 9, Definition 9.5 and subsequent results)
allow us to obtain the existence of what Magill calls an expansion function (Definition 5.1 and Assumption
3, p.687, [12]) which is a key assumption for proving the existence theorem. In [4], Section 4.3, the same
setting as [12], Section 9, is used. By this means, it can be proved that the Technology Conditions (i) and
(ii), p. 81 occur and again this is a key point to prove the existence theorem. In [2] we find the Growth
Condition 2.4 (p. 424) to be essential for the proof of existence (together with the compactness of A (0)).
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optimal control problem where s is the state variable and x and c are the control variables.
We now describe this problem more formally.
A production-consumption strategy (x, c) is defined as a measurable and locally inte-
grable function of t : R+ →Rm×Rk (we will denote by L1loc
(
0,+∞;Rm+k) the set of such
functions). Then the differential equation (9) has a unique solution : R+ 7→Rn which is
absolutely continuous (we will denote by W 1,1loc (0,+∞;Rn) the set of such functions). As
this solution clearly depends on the initial datum s¯ and on the production-consumption
strategy (x, c), it will be denoted by the symbol st;¯s,(x,c), omitting the subscript s¯, (x, c)
when it is clear from the context.
Given an initial endowment s¯ we will say that a strategy (x, c) is admissible from s¯
if the triple
(
x, c, st;¯s,(x,c)
)
satisfies the constraints (11) and U1 (c) is well defined
3. The
set of admissible control strategies starting at s¯ will be denoted by A(¯s). We adopt the
following definition of optimal strategies.
Definition 2.1 A strategy (x∗, c∗) ∈ A(¯s) will be called optimal if we have Uσ(c∗) > −∞
and
+∞ > Uσ(c∗) ≥ Uσ(c)
for every admissible control pair (x, c) ∈ A(¯s).
We now comment on a set of assumptions that will be used throughout the paper.
Assumption 2.2 Each row of matrix A is semipositive.
This assumption means that no commodity can be produced without using some
commodity as an input.
Assumption 2.3 Each row of matrix B is semipositive.
This assumption means that each process produces something: i.e. that pure destruc-
tion processes are not dealt with as production processes.
Assumption 2.4 The initial datum s¯ ≥ 0 and the matrices A and B are such that there
is an admissible strategy (x∗, c∗) ∈ A(¯s) and a time t∗ > 0 such that ν (s˜t∗ ;¯s,(x∗,c∗)) > 0,
where s˜ is the subvector of vector s consisting of the first k elements.
If this assumption does not hold, then every admissible strategy starting from s¯ must
have ν(ct) = 0 a.e. This case holds little interest for investigation purposes.
3The condition on U1 (c) is relevant only when σ = 1. Note that for σ ∈ (0, 1) the function t →
e−ρtuσ (ν(ct)) is always nonnegative so it is always semiintegrable (with the integral eventually +∞).
On the other hand for σ > 1 the function t → e−ρtuσ (ν(ct)) is always negative (and may be −∞ when
ν(c)t = 0) and again it is always semiintegrable (with the integral eventually −∞). This means that the
intertemporal utility Uσ is always well defined for σ 6= 1. For σ = 1 the function t→ e−ρtuσ (ν(ct)) may
change sign so it may be not semiintegrable on [0,+∞). This is the reason why we need to require that
U1 (c) is well defined in order to define the admissibility of c.
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Assumption 2.5 The initial datum s¯ ≥ 0 and the matrices A and B are such that there
is an admissible strategy (x∗, c∗) ∈ A(¯s) and a time t∗ such that st∗ ;¯s,(x∗,c∗) is positive.
Assumption 2.5 implies that all commodities are available at any time t > 0 and,
in particular, that Assumption 2.4 is satisfied. Moreover Assumptions 2.4 and 2.5 could
be stated in terms of the zero components of the initial datum s¯ and of the structure
of matrices A and B. On this point, see Appendix D of [8]. Further, it can be shown
that Assumption 2.5 is not really restrictive, provided that Assumption 2.4 holds, in the
sense that when it does not hold, matrices A and B, vector s¯, and consumption goods
can be redefined in order to obtain an equivalent model in which Assumption 2.5 holds.
Assume, in fact, that Assumption 2.5 does not hold. Then there is a commodity j which
is not available at any time t ≥ 0 (sTt ej = 0 for every t ≥ 0). In this case any production
process i in which commodity j is employed (aij > 0) cannot be used. The model is
then equivalent to one in which matrices B and A and vector s, in the state equation
(9), are substituted with matrices D and C and vector s′, respectively, where matrix C is
obtained from A by deleting the j-th column and all rows which on the j-th column have a
positive element, matrix D is obtained from matrix B by deleting the corresponding rows
and the j-th column, and vector s′ is obtained from vector s by deleting the j-th element.
(If commodity j is a consumption good, it is also deleted from the list of consumption
goods.) Note that if in the new equivalent model the Assumption 2.5 does not hold and
matrices C and D are not void, the argument can be iterated. If matrices C and D
are void, then an equivalent model satisfying Assumption 2.5 is obtained by deleting the
nought elements of vector s′. In any case the algorithm is able to determine an equivalent
model in which Assumption 2.5 does hold. We will refer to the equivalent model found
in this way as the truncated model and to the corresponding technology as the truncated
technology, which then depends on s¯. It can easily be proved that if Assumptions 2.2, 2.3,
2.4 hold in the original technology, then they hold in the truncated technology too (see
Appendix D of [8]). If not otherwise mentioned, all the following assumptions refer to the
truncated technology.
Let us define
G0 :=
{
γ|∃x ∈ Rm : x ≥ 0,x 6= 0,xT [B− (γ + δx) A] ≥0
}
, Γ0 = maxG0
and, for i = 1, . . . , k,
Gi :=
{
γ|∃x ∈ Rm : x ≥ 0,xT [B− (γ + δx) A] ≥ eTi
}
, Γi = supGi
Γ0 is clearly the maximum among the uniform over time rates of growth feasible for
this economy and corresponds to what von Neumann [16] found both as growth rate and
as rate of profit. Γi is the upper bound of the uniform over time rates of reproduction of
the i−th consumption good. Obviously Γi ≤ Γ0 for every i = 1, . . . , k.
Magill [12], Assumption T.2, p. 703, assumed that if x ∈ X , then xTB > 0T , where
X = {x|x ≥ 0,x 6= 0,xT [B− (Γ0 + δx) A] ≥ 0T}
It is easily checked that, under this assumption, if x ∈ X and xTAei = 0, then there is
α > 0 such that
xT [B− (Γ0 + δx) A] ≥ αeTi
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whereas if x ∈ X and xTAei > 0, then for any ε > 0 there is α > 0 such that
xT [B− (Γ0 − ε+ δx) A] ≥ αeTi
In any case
sup
{
γ|∃x ∈ Rm : x ≥ 0,x 6= 0,xT [B− (γ + δx) A] ≥ eTi
}
= Γ0
that is, the upper bound of the uniform over time rates of reproduction of any commodity
equals the maximum rate of growth. In this paper we will not make any assumption on
indecomposability.
It is easily proved that the Γi’s relative to the truncated technology are not greater
than the corresponding Γi’s relative to the original one. If either Bei = Aei = 0 or
matrices A and B are void, then Γi = −∞. Moreover if Bei = 0 and Aei 6= 0 then
Γi = −δx. Finally, if Bei 6= 0 and if commodity j is available at time 0 (¯sTej > 0) and
is essential to the reproduction of the i−th consumption good, then Γi = −δx.4 (see [8]
Proposition 4.4).
Assumption 2.6 Bei 6= 0 for each consumption good i and δz < δx.
Assumption 2.6 is not necessary, but it helps in simplifying the exposition since
it implies that Γi > −δz for each consumption good i. The first part means that all
consumption goods are technologically producible. The second part implies that using
commodities in production dominates their storing; i.e. it is not convenient to produce
something just in order to dispose something else.
We call
Γmax := max
i=1,...,k
Γi, Γmin := min
i=1,...,k
Γi > 0
Moreover we introduce the following number
Γν = inf
{
η ∈ R : lim
t→+∞
e−ηtν
(
eΓ1t, eΓ2t, . . . , eΓkt
)
= 0
}
= sup
{
η ∈ R : lim
t→+∞
e−ηtν
(
eΓ1t, eΓ2t, . . . , eΓkt
)
= +∞
}
Since, from the homogeneity of degree 1 and the monotonicity of ν, we have
eΓmintν(1, 1, . . . , 1) ≤ ν (eΓ1t, eΓ2t, . . . , eΓkt) ≤ eΓmaxtν(1, 1, . . . , 1)
then it is easy to see that Γmin ≤ Γν ≤ Γmax.
It is also easy to check that, for the four examples given in (5), (6), (7), and (8),we
have:
4We say that commodity j is essential to the reproduction of the i−th consumption good when(
x ≥ 0, ε > 0,xT [B− εA] ≥ ei
)⇒ xTAej 6= 0.
8
• in the example (5), Γν =
∑k
i=1 αiΓi,
• in the example (6), Γν = Γmin,
• in the example (7), Γν = Γmax,
• in the example (8), Γν = Γmax if 0 < q < 1 whereas Γν = Γmin if q < 0.
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper is mainly devoted to showing the role that
the following assumption plays in the existence of optimal strategies of the problem under
analysis.
Assumption 2.7
Γν >
Γν − ρ
σ
The reader will have noticed that we used the convoluted expression “the upper
bound of the uniform over time rates of reproduction of the i−th consumption good”
instead of the more straightforward “the upper bound of the rates of reproduction of the
i−th consumption good”. This is because, for particular forms of matrices, growth rates
of consumption might be found which are higher, but not uniform over time. In [7] we
provided the following example, with details, to clarify this point.
Example 2.8 k = 1, δx = δz ∈ (0, 1) and
A =
[
0 1 0
0 0 1
]
, B =
[
1 1 0
0 1 1
]
.
It is immediately recognized that Γ1 = 1 − δx > 0. Nevertheless, consumption can grow
at the rate
c˙
c
= Γ1 +
β
α + βt
> Γ1
where α and β are positive constants.
We finally observe that, from the definition of Γν the value of the limit
lim
t→+∞
e−Γνtν
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)
,
may be any L ∈ [0,+∞]. However, as shown in the Appendix when the law of the
function ν is made only by a finite number of sums, products, powers, and/or max/min
over a finite number of terms - which is e.g. the case of the examples (5), (6), (7), (8)
above - then L ∈ (0,+∞). In the same appendix we provide examples in which either
L = 0 or L = +∞. The relevance of these two cases is explored in Theorem 3.3.
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3 The main results
The main goal of this paper is to show that in the general context outlined by Assumptions
2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, we have substantially an if and only if condition for the existence of
optimal strategies. In this paper we will prove the following results:
Theorem 3.1 If Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 hold, then there is an optimal
strategy (x, c) for problem (Pσ) starting at s¯. Moreover this strategy is unique in the sense
that if (x˜, c˜) is another optimal strategy, then ν(c˜) ≡ ν(c). If ν is strictly concave, then
we also have c˜ ≡ c.
Theorem 3.2 Let Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6 hold. If
Γν <
Γν − ρ
σ
then no optimal strategy exists for problem (Pσ) starting at s¯.
Theorem 3.3 Let Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6 hold. Let
Γν =
Γν − ρ
σ
.
Then we have the following:
1. Let σ = 1.
• If Γν < 0, then all strategies have value −∞ and so no optimal strategy exists
for problem (P1) starting at s¯.
• If Γν > 0 there exists an admissible strategy with value +∞ and so no optimal
strategy exists for problem (P1) starting at s¯.
• If Γν = 0, each Γi is not a maximum and
lim
t→+∞
e−Γνtν
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)
< +∞, (13)
then all strategies have value −∞ and so no optimal strategy exists for problem
(P1) starting at s¯.
• If Γν = 0, each Γi is a maximum,
lim
t→+∞
e−Γνtν
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)
> 0, (14)
and s¯ satisfy5
s¯Tej >
k∑
i=1
xTi Aej, j = 1, . . . n.
(where xi is the maximum point of Gi), then there exists an admissible strategy
with value +∞ and so no optimal strategy exists for problem (P1) starting at
s¯.
5Note that this is always true if all components of s¯ are very large.
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2. Let σ ∈ (0, 1). If each Γi is a maximum and (14) holds then there exists an admissible
strategy with value +∞ and so no optimal strategy exists for problem (Pσ) starting
at s¯.
3. Let σ > 1. If each Γi is not a maximum and (13) holds, then all strategies have
value −∞ and so no optimal strategy exists for problem (Pσ) starting at s¯.
The limit cases where Γν =
Γν−ρ
σ
and
1. σ = 1, Γν = 0, and at least one Γi is a maximum or (13) does not hold;
2. σ = 1, Γν = 0, and at least one Γi is not a maximum or (14) does not hold or s¯ is
not big enough;
3. σ ∈ (0, 1) and at least one Γi is not a maximum or (14) does not hold;
4. σ > 1 and at least one Γi is a maximum or (13) does not hold;
are intrinsically more complex than the others. Indeed in such cases we can have existence
or nonexistence depending on the value of σ. In our paper [7] (see also [8] for details) we
provided two examples of matrices A and B and scalars ρ, δx, δz showing counterexamples
when k = 1 and Γν = Γ1 > 0. Here we provide an example of the case when σ = 1, k = 1,
Γν = Γ1 = 0 is a maximum, and (14) holds, showing what happens for different values of
s¯.
Example 3.4 k = 1, δx = δz = 1 and
A =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, B =
[
1 0
1 1
]
.
It is immediately recognized that Γν = Γ1 = 0 and that it is a maximum. The maximum
point in the definition of Γ1 is (x1, 1) for every x1 ≥ 0. The constant strategy xt = α(0, 1),
ct = α, for any α > 0, is admissible if and only if s¯2 ≥ α. So, if s¯1 ≥ 0 and s¯2 ≥ 1, then
such an admissible strategy has value +∞. On the other hand, the state control constraints
imply that s′1 ≤ s2 − c and s′2 ≤ 0 so. Hence, by integrating, we get, for t ≥ 0,∫ t
0
csds ≤ s¯1 + ts¯2
which implies ∫ t
0
ln csds ≤ t ln
[ s¯1
t
+ s¯2
]
.
The above implies that, when s¯2 < 1 then U(c) = −∞ for every admissible strategy.
Moreover, when s¯2 = 1, then the strategy above has value zero and U(c) ≤ s¯1 for every
admissible strategy. In this last case there exists an optimal strategy.
Remark 3.5 If Γν is invariant to a small change in Γi, consumption good i is said to be
marginally inessential to the definition of Γν; otherwise it is marginally essential. In the
above Theorem 3.3, each time all Γi’s are required to be maximum or not, this requirement
can be restricted to the goods that are marginally essential to the definition of Γν.
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4 Proofs of the main results
In this section, we provide the proofs of the main results stated in section 3. The proofs
require a set of preliminary results which we discuss in Subsection 4.1. In Subsection 4.2
we prove the existence and nonexistence results stated above as Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and
3.3.
Throughout this section we will assume that Assumptions 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6 hold
without explicitly mentioning them. We observe that some results hold in the more general
framework when Assumption 2.6 does not hold; on this point see also Appendix A and B
of [8].
4.1 Preliminary lemmata
The following Lemma provides the basis for estimates of the state and control trajectories.
Lemma 4.1 Let i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If Γi is not a maximum
γ ≥ Γi ⇐⇒ ∃viF≥ 0 : (B− (γ + δx) A) viF≤ 0, eTi viF=1. (15)
If Γi is a maximum
γ > Γi ⇐⇒ ∃viF≥ 0 : (B− (γ + δx) A) viF≤ 0, eTi viF = 1, (16)
Moreover
∃viS≥ 0 : (B− (Γi + δx) A) viS≤ 0,viS 6= 0, (17)
and
eTi v
i
S = y
T [B− (Γi + δx) A] viS = 0, (18)
where
y ∈ {x|x ≥ 0,xT [B− (Γi + δx) A] ≥ eTi } .
Proof. Statements (15) and (16) are obvious applications of the Farkas Lemma (see
for instance Gale’s theorem for linear inequalities; [10] or [14], pp. 33-34). Assume now
that statement (17) does not hold and obtain, once again from the Farkas Lemma (see
for instance Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative; [15] or [14], pp. 28-29), that
∃w ≥ 0 : wT [B− (Γi + δx) A] > 0T .
Hence there is φ > 0 so large and η > 0 so small that
φwT [B− (Γi + δx) A] ≥ eTi + ηφwTA
Hence a contradiction since Γi = supGi. By remarking that
0 ≥ yT [B− (Γi + δx) A] viS ≥ eTi viS ≥ 0
the proof is completed.
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The next lemma and the subsequent corollary give various estimates for the state and
control variables that will be the basis for the proof of existence and nonexistence. Note
that for the case σ ∈ (0, 1) we are interested in an estimate from above of the integral∫ t
0
e−ρsν(cs)1−σds giving finiteness of the value function for ρ − Γν(1 − σ) > 0 (so we
need terms that remain bounded when t→ +∞), while for the case σ ∈ (1,+∞) we are
interested in an estimate from below of the same integral to show that the value function
is equal to −∞ when ρ− Γν(1− σ) < 0, (so we need terms that explode when t→ +∞).
These different targets require the use of different estimates with different methods of
proof. Of course, both methods can be applied to both cases, albeit yielding estimates
that are not useful for our target. In order to simplify notation we will set, for ε ≥ 0,
Γi := max{−δz,Γi} (19)
Γi,ε := max{−δz,Γi + ε} (20)
ai,ε = ρ− Γi,ε(1− σ) (21)
aν,ε = ρ− (Γν + ε) (1− σ). (22)
Obviously, if Assumption 2.6 holds, Γi = Γi and Γi,ε := Γi + ε.
Lemma 4.2 Let i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and σ > 0. Fix ε > 0 when Γi is a maximum and
ε = 0 when Γi is not a maximum; call v
i
F,ε the vector given by Lemma 4.1. For every
0 ≤ t < +∞, s¯ ∈ Rn, s¯ ≥ 0 we have, for every admissible control strategy (x, c) ∈ A(¯s),
sTt v
i
F,ε ≤ eΓi,εts¯TviF,ε, (23)
and, for η ∈ R ∫ t
0
e−ηssTs v
i
F,εds ≤ s¯TviF,ε e
(Γi,ε−η)t−1
Γi,ε−η ; η 6= Γi,ε;∫ t
0
e−ηssTs v
i
F,εds ≤ s¯TviF,εt; η = Γi,ε;
(24)
and, setting Ii,ε(t) :=
∫ t
0
e−Γi,εscˆTs v
i
F,εds,
Ii,ε(t) + e
−Γi,εtxTt Av
i
F,ε ≤ s¯TviF,ε. (25)
Moreover, for 0 ≤ τ ≤ t < +∞, and η ∈ R,
xTt Av
i
F,εe
−ηt +
∫ t
τ
e−ηscˆTs v
i
F,εds ≤ e−ητ s¯Tτ viF,εe(Γi,ε−η)
+
(t−τ). (26)
Finally there exists a constant λ > 0 (depending only on the matrices A and B) such
that, for every t ≥ 0 ∣∣∣∣xTt A∣∣∣∣≤ ||st|| ≤ eλt ||¯s|| , ||xt|| ≤ Ceλt ||¯s|| (27)
for suitable real number C > 0 (depending only on the matrix A).
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Proof. We prove the five inequalities (23)–(27) in order of presentation. We give only
a sketch. To avoid heavy notation we will write viF for v
i
F,ε along this proof.
(1) Let i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. First we observe that, by multiplying the state equation (9) by
viF we obtain
s˙Tt v
i
F = −δzsTt viF + xTt [B−δA] viF − cˆTt viF t ∈ (0,+∞),
sT0 v
i
F = s¯
TviF ≥ 0.
Now for every x and ε,
xT [B−δA] = xT [B− (Γi+ε+ δx) A] + (Γi + ε+ δz) xTA
Moreover for x ≥ 0 we have by (15) and (16) xT [B− (Γi + ε+ δx) A] viF ≤ 0 with
the agreement that ε = 0 when Γi is not a maximum. Then
s˙Tt v
i
F = −δzsTt viF + xTt [B− (Γi + ε+ δx) A] viF + (Γi + ε+ δz) xTt AviF − cˆTt viF
≤ −δzsTt viF + (Γi + ε+ δz) xTAviF − cˆTt viF
If Γi + ε ≥ −δz, from the constraint sTt ≥ xTt A and from the non-negativity of cˆt,
we get
s˙Tt v
i
F ≤ (Γi + ε) sTt viF − cˆTt viF ≤ (Γi + ε) sTt viF t ∈ (0,+∞), (28)
and so, by integrating on [0, t] and using the Gronwall lemma (see e.g. [3, p. 218])
we get the first claim (23).
Take now Γi + ε < −δz in this case we have (Γi + ε+ δz) xTAviF ≤ 0 which gives
s˙Tt v
i
F ≤ −δzsTt viF − cˆTt viF ≤ −δzsTt viF , t ∈ (0,+∞), (29)
and so the claim (in this case we clearly can take ε = 0).
(2) Inequalities (24) are proved by multiplying the inequality (23) by e−ηs and integrat-
ing on [0, t].
(3) From (28) (taking ε = 0 when allowed)
s˙Ts vF ≤ Γi,εsTs viF − cˆTs viF ∀s ∈ [0, t] (30)
so that, by the comparison theorem for ODE’s
sTt v
i
F ≤ s¯TviF eΓi,εt −
∫ t
0
eΓi,ε(t−s)cˆTs v
i
Fds
From the inequality xTt Av
i
F≤ sTt viF we get inequality (25) by rearranging the terms.
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(4) For simplicity we take the case τ = 0. Inequality (26) easily follows by multiplying
both sides of (30) by e−ηs and then integrating. Indeed we have
0 ≤ e−ηscˆTs viF ≤ e−ηs
[
Γi,εs
T
s v
i
F − s˙Ts viF
] ∀s ∈ [0, t]
Now we integrate the above expression, then we integrate by parts and use that
xTt Av
i
F≤ sTt viF :∫ t
0
e−ηscˆTs v
i
Fds ≤
∫ t
0
e−ηs
[
Γi,εs
T
s v
i
F − s˙Ts viF
]
ds
=
∫ t
0
e−ηsΓi,εsTs v
i
Fds− e−ηtsTt viF + s¯TviF − η
∫ t
0
e−ηssTs v
i
Fds
≤ s¯TviF − e−ηtxTt AviF +
(
Γi,ε − η
) ∫ t
0
e−ηssTs v
i
Fds
Now, if η ≥ Γi,ε the above inequality gives the claim immediately. If η < Γi,ε we get
the claim by using (24).
(5) The inequality (27) comes as follows. By Assumption 2.2 for every i there exists j
such that aij > 0 so that
xTei ≤ a−1ij sTej
and we can find a nonnegative matrix n ×m C with exactly one positive element
for every column such that xT ≤ sTC. Consequently we have, for xTA ≤ sT ,
xTB ≤ sTCB.
Now the matrix D = CB is n × n and has only positive elements. From the state
equation (9) it follows that for every admissible strategy we have
s˙Tt ≤ sTt D− δzsTt − cˆTt .
Since the control cˆ is positive and D has only positive elements one gets
sTt ≤ s¯T et[D−δzI]
so the claim easily follows taking any λ > max {Reµ,µ eigenvalue of D} − δz
For η ∈ R define, for every 0 ≤ s < +∞, s¯ ∈ Rn, s¯ ≥ 0 and (x, c) ∈ A(¯s), the
quantity
Iη(s) :=
∫ s
0
e−ηrν (c1r, c2r, . . . , ckr) dr. (31)
The following estimates hold.
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Lemma 4.3 Let t ≥ 0, s¯ ∈ Rn, s¯ ≥ 0 and (x, c) ∈ A(¯s). We have, for σ ∈ (0, 1),∫ t
0
e−ρsν (c1s, c2s, . . . , cks)
1−σ ds ≤ tσ
[
I ρ
1−σ
(t)
]1−σ
(32)
while, for σ ∈ (1,+∞),∫ t
0
e−ρsν (c1s, c2s, . . . , cks)
1−σ ds ≥ tσ
[
I ρ
1−σ
(t)
]1−σ
. (33)
Moreover let η ∈ R. Then, for σ = 1 we have∫ t
0
e−ρs log [ν (c1s, c2s, . . . , cks)] ds ≤ te−ρt
[
η
2
t+ log
(
Iη(t)
t
)]
(34)
+[ρ]+
∫ t
0
se−ρs
[
η
2
s+ log
(
Iη(s)
s
)]
ds
while, for σ ∈ (0, 1),∫ t
0
e−ρsν (c1s, c2s, . . . , cks)
1−σ ds (35)
≤ Iη(t)1−σtσe−(ρ−η(1−σ))t + [ρ− η(1− σ)]+
∫ t
0
Iη(s)
1−σsσe−(ρ−η(1−σ))sds
and, for σ > 1, and ρ > η(1− σ),∫ t
0
e−ρsν (c1s, c2s, . . . , cks)
1−σ ds (36)
≥ Iη(t)1−σtσe−(ρ−η(1−σ))t + (ρ− η(1− σ))
∫ t
0
Iη(s)
1−σsσe−(ρ−η(1−σ))sds
Proof.
(1) Concerning inequality (35) we take η ∈ R. Setting
hη(s) :=
∫ s
0
[
e−ηrν (c1s, c2s, . . . , cks)
]1−σ
dr
we have, by Jensen’s inequality, for σ ∈ (0, 1)
hη(s) ≤ s
[
1
s
∫ s
0
e−ηrν (c1s, c2s, . . . , cks) dr
]1−σ
= sσIη(s)
1−σ (37)
Now integrating by parts we obtain∫ t
0
e−ρsν (c1s, c2s, . . . , cks)
1−σ ds =
∫ t
0
e−(ρ−η(1−σ))s
[
e−ηsν (c1s, c2s, . . . , cks)
]1−σ
ds
= e−(ρ−η(1−σ))thη(t) +
∫ t
0
(ρ− η (1− σ)) e−(ρ−η(1−σ))shη(s)ds (38)
≤ e−(ρ−η(1−σ))tsσIη(t)1−σ + [ρ− η (1− σ)]+
∫ t
0
e−(ρ−η(1−σ))ssσIη(s)1−σds.
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which gives the claim. Inequality (32) follows observing that∫ t
0
e−ρsν (c1s, c2s, . . . , cks)
1−σ ds = h ρ
1−σ
(t) (39)
and using inequality (37).
(2) To prove inequality (33) dealing with the case when σ ∈ (1,+∞) we still observe
that (39) holds and then apply the Jensen inequality. Since the power function
x→ x1−σ is convex we get the inequality (37) with ≥ and so the claim.
Similarly inequality (36) follows integrating by part exactly as for proving (35) and
then applying the reversed Jensen inequality.
(3) Inequality (34) follows by similar arguments. In fact, calling, for η ∈ R
h(s) :=
∫ s
0
log ν(cr)dr =
∫ s
0
ηrdr +
∫ s
0
log
(
e−ηrν(cr)
)
dr
we have, because of Jensen’s inequality
h(s) ≤ ηs
2
2
+ s log
[
Iη(s)
s
]
. (40)
Now, integrating by parts as in (38), we obtain∫ t
0
e−ρs log ν(cs)ds = e−ρth(t) +
∫ t
0
ρe−ρsh(s)ds. (41)
which, together with (40) and (25), gives the claim.
Remark 4.4 We observe that, if the constraint (12) is assumed to hold then the proof
of the above lemma would be simpler. Indeed all estimates on the integrals containing the
consumption strategy (25)–(34) would be immediately true since, thanks to (23) and (27)
we would have an estimate of the type ct ≤ Ceλt ||¯s||.
Moreover an estimate of this kind would allow us to prove the existence result more
simply, using the technique of proof of the existence Theorem 2.8 of [2] (see also [4, 12]),
based on the compactness of the derivatives of the stock (Theorem 4.2) in the space of ab-
solutely continuous functions (which, in our model, would be equivalent to the compactness
of the set of admissible strategies in a suitable weighted space of integrable functions).
Since we do not have this property we employ a different technique that exploits the
structure of our problem. In the case when σ ∈ (0, 1), we change variables to get compact-
ness in the new variable and then we go back to the old variable; in the other cases we use
a result that strongly exploits the structure of the problem, in particular the monotonicity
of the functions involved.
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4.2 Proof of existence and nonexistence theorems
We now prove the above Theorem 3.1 about existence and Theorems 3.2, 3.3 about
nonexistence of optimal strategies. The proof of nonexistence consists in providing suitable
estimates for the value of admissible strategies; the proof of existence requires a “dual”
version of such estimates and then uses compactness arguments. Due to the complexity of
the problem (that combines the difficulties of solving inequalities for positive matrices with
the dynamic optimization problem), to our knowledge the results given in the literature
cannot apply to this case (see [5] and [19] for similar results). For this reason we give a
complete proof.
The structure of the proof is a little complex since various cases need to be analyzed.
To be precise, for existence we need to prove that:
1 the admissible strategies always have the value < +∞ (this is obvious for σ > 1 as
uσ ≥ 0, but nontrivial for σ ≤ 1)
2 at least one admissible strategy has the value > −∞ (this is obvious for σ < 1 as
uσ > 0, but nontrivial for σ ≥ 1);
3 suitable compactness arguments can be applied.
For the nonexistence proof we need to prove that
1′ in the case when σ < 1 (or σ = 1 and Γν > 0) either at least one admissible strategy
has the value = +∞ or there exists a sequence of admissible strategies with values
converging to +∞;
2′ in the case σ > 1 (or σ = 1 and Γν ≤ 0), all admissible strategies have the value
= −∞.
The techniques needed to prove points 1 and 2′ are very similar. Moreover, the tech-
niques needed to prove points 2 and 1′ are also very similar. So we give first Proposition
4.5 where points 1 and 2′ are dealt with. Then in Proposition 4.7 points 2 and 1′ are
treated. These two Propositions prove the nonexistence Theorems 3.2, 3.3 and provide
elements for the proof of Theorem 3.1. In order to complete the proof of the existence
Theorem 3.1 we still have to tackle point 3 which is the aim of Proposition 4.9. In the
statement below we denote by ΓE the Euler Gamma function.
Proposition 4.5 Given any s ≥ 0, satisfying Assumption 2.5 the following hold.
1. Let σ ∈ (0, 1). Fix ε > 0 (ε = 0 when Γi is not a maximum for every i = 1, . . . , k)
such that ρ
1−σ > Γν+ε. Then for any (x, c) ∈ A(s) and η such that ρ1−σ > η > Γν+ε
we have
0 ≤ Uσ(c) ≤ ρ− η(1− σ)
1− σ ·
ΓE(1 + σ)
(ρ− η(1− σ))1+σ
[
Cε
k∑
i=1
s¯TviF,ε
]1−σ
< +∞ (42)
for a suitable Cε independent of the initial datum and of the control strategy.
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2. Let σ = 1 (in this case for every ε we have aν,ε = ρ). If ρ > 0 and η > Γν + ε then
for every (x, c) ∈ A(s) we have
Uσ(c) ≤ ρ
∫ +∞
0
e−ρss
[
η
2
s+ log
(
C1ε
∑k
i=1 s¯
TviF,ε
s
)]
ds < +∞. (43)
for a suitable C1ε independent of the initial datum and the control strategy. If ρ ≤ 0
and Γν < 0 then Uσ(c) = −∞ for every (x, c) ∈ A(s). The same if ρ ≤ 0, Γν = 0,
lim
t→+∞
e−Γνtν
(
eΓ¯1t, . . . , eΓ¯kt
)
< +∞ (44)
and Γi is not a maximum for every i = 1, . . . k.
3. If σ > 1, then
Uσ(c) ≤ 0.
Moreover if aν,0 < 0 then Uσ(c) = −∞ for every (x, c) ∈ A(s). The same holds if
aν,0 = 0, (44) holds and Γi is not a maximum for every i = 1, . . . k.
Proof.
(0) We first prove a key estimate for Iη(t). Setting, for i = 1, . . . , k, ε > 0 (ε = 0 if each
Γi is not a maximum), s ≥ 0,
ωi,ε,s := e
−Γ¯i,εscis, ωmax,ε,s := max{ωi,ε,s, i = 1, . . . , k},
we have, using (25) and the fact that eTi v
i
F,ε=1,∫ t
0
ωmax,ε,sds ≤
k∑
i=1
∫ t
0
ωi,ε,sds ≤
k∑
i=1
s¯TviF,ε, ∀t ≥ 0. (45)
Now, for η ∈ R, we have
Iη(t) =
∫ t
0
e−ηsν (c1s, c2s, . . . , cks) ds
=
∫ t
0
e−(η−Γν)se−Γνsν
(
eΓ¯1,εsω1,ε,s, e
Γ¯2,εsω2,ε,s, . . . , e
Γ¯k,εsωk,ε,s
)
ds
≤
∫ t
0
e−(η−(Γν+ε))se−Γνsν
(
eΓ¯1sω1,ε,s, e
Γ¯2sω2,ε,s, . . . , e
Γ¯ksωk,ε,s
)
ds
≤
∫ t
0
e−(η−(Γν+ε))sωmax,ε,se−Γνsν
(
eΓ¯1s, . . . , eΓ¯ks
)
ds (46)
If η > Γν + ε then, by the definition of Γν , we have that the function
t→ e−(η−(Γν+ε))se−Γνsν
(
eΓ¯1s, . . . , eΓ¯ks
)
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is bounded on [0,+∞) (say by a constant Cε independent of the initial datum and
on the control strategy) and so, by putting (45) into (46) we get
Iη(t) ≤ Cε
k∑
i=1
s¯TviF,ε, ∀t ≥ 0. (47)
Similarly, if
lim
t→+∞
e−Γνtν
(
eΓ¯1t, . . . , eΓ¯kt
)
< +∞
and Γi is not a maximum for every i = 1, . . . k, then we can choose ε = 0 and η = Γν
in (46) and still get (47) with ε = 0, η = Γν .
(1) Now we prove estimate (42) using (35). Take η < ρ
1−σ , put the estimate (47) into
(35) and let t→ +∞. We get
Uσ(c) ≤ ρ− η(1− σ)
1− σ
[
Cε
k∑
i=1
s¯TviF,ε
]1−σ ∫ +∞
0
sσe−(ρ−η(1−σ))sds
≤ ρ− η(1− σ)
1− σ ·
ΓE(1 + σ)
(ρ− η(1− σ))1+σ
[
Cε
k∑
i=1
s¯TviF,ε
]1−σ
so the claim (42) follows.
(2) If σ = 1 and ρ > 0 we get (43) taking η > Γν + ε, putting (47) into (34) and letting
t→ +∞.
If ρ = 0, then from (34) and (47) we get, for η > Γν + ε∫ t
0
log ν(cs)ds ≤ t
[
t
η
2
+ log
(
Cε
∑k
i=1 s¯
TviF,ε
t
)]
so if Γν < 0 we take ε > 0, η < 0 such that η > Γν + ε. Then we get, in the limit
for t→ +∞, that U1(c) = −∞.
Let finally Γν = 0,
lim
t→+∞
e−Γνtν
(
eΓ¯1t, . . . , eΓ¯kt
)
< +∞
and Γi is not a maximum for every i = 1, . . . k. Then by part (0) of this proof we
can take η = Γν = 0 and ε = 0 in (47) so the estimate (34) becomes∫ t
0
log ν(cs)ds ≤ t log
(
C0
∑k
i=1 s¯
TviF,0
t
)
so, in the limit for t→ +∞, we still get that U1(c) = −∞. If ρ < 0 and Γν < 0 (or
Γν = 0 when possible) then∫ t
0
e−ρs log ν(cs)ds =
∫ t
0
e−ρs [log ν(cs)]
+ ds+
∫ t
0
e−ρs [log ν(cs)]
− ds.
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Now, thanks to the nonpositivity of the negative part and to the fact that e−ρs ≥ 1,∫ t
0
e−ρs [log ν(cs)]
− ds ≤
∫ t
0
[log ν(cs)]
− ds.
Since the right hand side goes to −∞ as t → +∞ (thanks to the case ρ = 0) we
have
∫ +∞
0
e−ρs [log ν(cs)]
− ds = −∞. By admissibility this implies that the integral
of the positive part is finite and so U1(c) = −∞.
(3) When σ > 1 it is obvious that Uσ(c) ≤ 0 by construction. Moreover using (33) and
(47) with η = ρ
1−σ > Γν + ε we get
1
1− σ
∫ t
0
e−ρsν(c1s, c2s, . . . , cks)1−σds ≤ t
σ
1− σ
(
Cε
k∑
i=1
s¯TviF,ε
)1−σ
and letting t → +∞ we get Uσ(c) = −∞ for every admissible strategy. Finally
if aν,0 = 0, (44) holds and Γi is not a maximum for every i = 1, . . . k, we know
from part (0) of this proof that (47) still holds so we can still let t → +∞ and get
Uσ(c) = −∞ for every admissible strategy.
Remark 4.6 The above result shows in particular that, when aν,0 > 0 and σ ∈ (0, 1), the
intertemporal utility functional Uσ(c) is finite and uniformly bounded for every admissible
production-consumption strategy (while for σ ≥ 1 it is only bounded from above). In the
cases when
1. σ = 1, ρ ≤ 0, Γν < 0;
2. σ = 1, ρ ≤ 0 and Γν = 0, each Γi is not a maximum and (44) holds;
3. σ > 1, aν,0 < 0;
4. σ > 1, aν,0 = 0, each Γi is not a maximum and (44) holds;
Proposition 4.5 shows that there are no optimal strategies in the sense of Definition 2.1
since all strategies have utility −∞.
Proposition 4.7 Let s ≥ 0.
1. Let σ ∈ (0, 1) and, either aν,0 < 0, or aν,0 = 0, each Γi is a maximum for i = 1, . . . , k
and
lim
t→+∞
e−Γνtν
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)
> 0. (48)
Then there exists an admissible strategy (x, c) ∈ A(s) such that Uσ(c) = +∞.
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2. Let σ = 1, aν,0 = ρ ≤ 0, Γν > 0. Then there exists an admissible strategy (x, c) ∈
A(s) such that Uσ(c) = +∞.
Moreover, if aν,0 = ρ = 0 and Γν = 0, each Γi is a maximum, (14) holds and s¯
satisfy
s¯Tej >
k∑
i=1
xTi Aej, j = 1, . . . n.
(where xi is the maximum point of Gi), then there exists an admissible strategy with
value +∞. If the limit in (14) is +∞ then the above holds for every s¯.
3. Let σ ≥ 1 and aν,0 > 0, then there exists an admissible strategy (x, c) ∈ A(s) with
Uσ(c) > −∞.
Proof. We prove the three points separately.
Proof of 1. Consider first the case when σ ∈ (0, 1) and aν,0 < 0. First let the system
evolve to reach a state s0> 0 (this is possible since Assumption 2.5 holds). This means that
we can take from the beginning s¯ > 0. At this point we observe that for any i = 1, . . . , k
and ε > 0 (ε = 0 if Γi is a maximum for every i) we can find xi,ε ≥ 0 such that
xTi,ε (B− (Γi − ε+ δx) A) ≥ eTi ⇒ xTi,ε (B−δA) ≥ eTi + (Γi − ε+ δz) xTi,εA.
Take now β0 > 0 and β1, . . . βk such that βi ≥ 0. Set
xε,s := β0
k∑
i=1
βixi,εe
(Γi−ε)s, s ≥ 0.
We clearly have that xε,s≥ 0, xε,s 6= 0 for every s ≥ 0 and
xTε,s (B−δA) ej = β0
k∑
i=1
βie
(Γi−ε)sxTi,ε (B−δA) ej ≥ β0
k∑
i=1
βie
(Γi−ε)s [eTi ej + (Γi − ε+ δz) xTi,εAej]
Consider now the control strategy xt = xε,t, ct = β0(β1e
(Γ1−ε)t, . . . , βke(Γk−ε)t) for each
t ≥ 0. Since, for t ≥ 0, we have
xTε,t (B−δA) ej − cˆTt ej ≥ β0
k∑
i=1
βie
(Γi−ε)t (Γi − ε+ δz) xTi,εAej
and the associated solution of the state equation (9) is given by:
sTt = e
−δzts¯T+
∫ t
0
e−δz(t−s)xTε,s [B− δA] ds−
∫ t
0
e−δz(t−s)cˆsds
= e−δzt
[
s¯T+
∫ t
0
(
xTε,s (B−δA)− cˆTs
)
eδzsds
]
,
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then
sTt ej ≥ e−δzt
[
s¯Tej+
∫ t
0
β0
k∑
i=1
βie
(δz+Γi−ε)s (Γi − ε+ δz) xTi,εAej ds
]
= e−δzt
[
s¯Tej+β0
k∑
i=1
βix
T
i,εAej
∫ t
0
e(δz+Γi−ε)s (Γi − ε+ δz) ds
]
= e−δzt
[
s¯Tej+β0
k∑
i=1
βix
T
i,εAej
(
e(δz+Γi−ε)t − 1)]
= e−δzt
[
s¯Tej−β0
k∑
i=1
βix
T
i,εAej
]
+ β0
k∑
i=1
βie
(Γi−ε)txTi,εAej
= e−δzt
[
s¯Tej−β0
k∑
i=1
βix
T
i,εAej
]
+ xTε,tAej
In this case it is clear that the constraints sTt ≥ xTt A are satisfied if, for every j = 1, . . . , n,
s¯Tej − β0
k∑
i=1
βix
T
i,εAej ≥ 0. (49)
Since s¯ >0, the above is true if we set β0 sufficiently small. So our control strategy is
admissible. Moreover setting β1 = . . . = βk = 1 we have
U(c) =
β1−σ0
1− σ
∫ +∞
0
e−ρtν
(
e(Γ1−ε)t, . . . , e(Γk−ε)t
)1−σ
dt
=
β1−σ0
1− σ
∫ +∞
0
e[−ρ+(Γν−ε)(1−σ)]t
[
e−Γνtν
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)]1−σ
dt
Using the definition of Γν and the fact that aν,0 < 0 we get that, for ε sufficiently small,
the above integral is +∞ and so the claim.
The case aν,0 = 0 follows simply observing that, in the above equation, since Γi
is a maximum for i = 1, . . . , k, we can take ε = 0 and, thanks to (48), we can take
ρ = Γν(1− σ).
Proof of 2. Take now the case when σ = 1 and aν,0 ≤ 0, Γν > 0. Since Γν > 0 let ε
such that Γν > 2ε. Then we take the above control strategy so that
U1(c) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt log ν
(
e(Γ1−ε)t, . . . , e(Γk−ε)t
)
ds =
=
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
[
log β0 + (Γν − 2ε)t+ log
(
e−(Γν−ε)tν
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
))]
dt.
Clearly, for aν,0 = ρ ≥ 0 the last integrand is locally bounded, definitely positive, and
goes to +∞ for t→ +∞. Then for this strategy we have U1(c) = +∞.
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In the case when σ = 1, aν,0 = ρ = 0, Γν = 0, each Γi is a maximum, and (14) holds,
the strategy defined in the proof of point 1 above is still admissible. However it has value
+∞ only if β0 is big enough (i.e. β0L > 1, where L is defined at the end of Section 2).
This means that also s¯ must be big enough so (49) is verified. In particular, if L = +∞,
again for every s¯ the claim holds.
Proof of 3. Let aν,0 > 0 and σ ∈ [1,+∞). We observe that (since admissibility does
not depend on the value of σ) the strategy found in point 1 above is admissible. We then
have, for σ ∈ (1,+∞)
U(c) =
β1−σ0
1− σ
∫ +∞
0
e[−ρ+(Γν−ε)(1−σ)]t
[
e−Γνtν
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)]1−σ
dt
so, if ε > 0 is such that −ρ+ (Γν − ε)(1− σ) < 0 we get the claim.
For σ = 1 we have
U1(c) =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt log ν
(
e(Γ1−ε)t, . . . , e(Γk−ε)t
)
ds =
=
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt
[
log β0 + Γνt+ log
(
e−(Γν+ε)tν
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
))]
dt.
Since the last integrand is less than polynomially growing and ρ = aν,0 > 0 then the
integral above is finite, so U1(c) > −∞.
Remark 4.8 The above result shows in particular that, when aν,0 > 0 and σ ∈ [1,+∞),
the intertemporal utility functional Uσ(c) is not always −∞ so it is bounded from below
(recall that from Proposition 4.5 we already know that in these case Uσ(c) is bounded from
above). Moreover in the cases when
1. σ ∈ (0, 1) and aν,0 < 0;
2. σ ∈ (0, 1), aν,0 = 0, each Γi is a maximum and (48) holds;
3. σ = 1, aν,0 ≤ 0 and Γν > 0;
4. σ = 1, aν,0 = 0, Γν = 0, each Γi is a maximum (48) holds and s¯ is big enough;
Proposition 4.7 shows that there are no optimal strategies in the sense of Definition 2.1
since the supremum of the utility is +∞.
Summing up the informations taken from Propositions 4.5 and 4.7 we can say the
following.
• In the cases when aν,0 > 0 we know that the functional is uniformly bounded (case
σ ∈ (0, 1)) or bounded from from above and not identically −∞ (case σ ≥ 1);
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• In the cases when aν,0 ≤ 0 we have nonexistence when
1. σ ∈ (0, 1) and aν,0 < 0;
2. σ ∈ (0, 1), aν,0 = 0, each Γi is a maximum and (48) holds;
3. σ = 1, aν,0 ≤ 0, Γν 6= 0
4. σ = 1, aν,0 ≤ 0, Γν = 0, each Γi is not a maximum and (44) holds;
5. σ = 1, aν,0 = 0, Γν = 0, each Γi is a maximum (48) holds and s¯ is big enough;
6. σ > 1 and aν,0 < 0
7. σ > 1, aν,0 = 0, each Γi is not a maximum and (44) holds.
We observe that, to end the treatment of nonexistence result one should deal with a
complete treatment of the following limiting cases:
• σ ∈ (0, 1) and aν,0 = 0;
• σ = 1, aν,0 ≤ 0, Γν = 0;
• σ > 1 and aν,0 = 0
Proof of Theorem 3.2. It follows directly from Proposition 4.5, Proposition 4.7
and the remarks above.
Now we come to prove existence when aν,0 > 0 using compactness arguments. To do
this we need first to prove suitable properties of the set A (¯s) which are given in the next
proposition. First we recall a simple definition: given a measurable function g1 : R+→ R
we denote by L∞g1 (0,+∞;Rm) the set of measurable functions f : R+→ Rm such that the
product f · g1 is bounded on R+. Moreover given a measurable function g2 : R+→ Rk
we denote by L1g2
(
0,+∞;Rk) the set of measurable functions f : R+→ Rk such that the
product fi · g2,i is integrable on R+ for each i = 1, . . . , k. We set g1 (t) = eλt (λ is given
by (27) of Lemma 4.2) and g2 (t) = (e
(Γ1+ε)t, . . . , e(Γk+ε)t) for ε > 0 such that aν,ε > 0.
Proposition 4.9 Let Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 be verified. Let also σ ∈ (0, 1)∪ (1,+∞).
Given any s¯ ≥ 0 the set A (¯s) of admissible control strategies starting at s¯ is a closed,
bounded, convex subset of the space L∞g1 (0,+∞;Rm)× L1g2
(
0,+∞;Rk). Moreover
(x,c) ∈ A (¯s) , λ ∈ [0, 1]⇒ (λx,λc) ∈ A (¯s) (50)
Finally, if ν is strictly concave the functional Uσ is strictly concave with respect to the
argument c. The same holds when σ = 1 and ρ > 0.
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Proof. Convexity. Let i = 1, 2 and let (xi,ci) ∈ A (¯s), and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Calling
(xλ,cλ) = λ (x1,c1) + (1− λ) (x2,c2)
then due to the linearity of the state equation (9)
st,¯s,(xλ,cλ) = λst,¯s,(x1,c1) + (1− λ) st,¯s,(x2,c2).
Since all constraints on (s, (x, c)) (i.e. x ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, xTA ≤ sT ) are linear it follows that,
since (xi,ci) (i = 1, 2) satisfy them, then so does (xλ,cλ). This yields (xλ,cλ) ∈ A (¯s) when
σ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,+∞). If σ = 1 we also have to prove that (xλ,cλ) is semiintegrable. This
follows from point (2) of Proposition 4.5. Indeed if ρ > 0, thanks to estimate (43) we know
all admissible strategies are upper semiintegrable, so also their convex combinations are
upper semiintegrable. Boundedness follows from the estimates of Lemma 4.2.
Closedness follows from the fact that all constraints are linear so all of them preserve
in the limit in the topology of L∞g1 (0,+∞;Rm) × L1g2
(
0,+∞;Rk). For σ = 1 we need to
know that the limit of semiintegrable sequences is again semiintegrable. For ρ > 0 this
follows from the estimate (43).
Homogeneity (50) follows from convexity and from the fact that the strategy (0,0)
is always admissible.
Strict concavity of the functional Uσ is a standard result (see e.g. [6]) and we omit
the proof.
Now we move on to the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The uniqueness property follows from the strict concavity of
Uσ proved in Proposition 4.9. The existence result follows applying a suitable modification
of Theorems 21 and 22 in [19, p. 406] (see also [18]). We divide it into three cases depending
on the value of σ.
Case σ > 1.
Here we can apply directly Theorem 22 and note 26 of [19, p. 406] plus [19, note 20,
p.137]. In fact this theorem asks the following:
1. the set U where the controls take values is closed (in our case U is Rm+ ×Rk+ i.e. the
positive orthant of Rm+k);
2. the functions defining the running utility ((s, (x,c) , t)→ e−ρtuσ (ν(c))), the dynam-
ics of the state equation ((s, (x,c) , t)→ −δzsT +xT (B−δA)−cˆ) and the constraints
((s, (x,c) , t)→ sT − xTA) are defined on the set
S =
{
(s, (x,c) , t) ∈ Rn+ ×
[
Rm+ × Rk+
]× R+ : sT − xTA ≥ 0} ,
are linear (or sum of linear and nondecreasing) in the variable s and continuous on
the set
S ′ =
{
(s, (x,c) , t) ∈ Rn+ ×
[
Rm+ × Rk+
]× R+ : sT − xTA ≥ 0} ;
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3. for each t ≥ 0 the set
S ′ (t) =
{
(s, (x,c)) ∈ Rn+ ×
[
Rm+ × Rk+
]
: sT − xTA ≥ 0}
is contained in the closure S0 (t) of the set
S0 (t) =
{
(s, (x,c)) ∈ Rn+ × U : sT − xTA > 0
}
;
4. for each n ∈ N and t ≥ 0 the set
Γnt =
{
(s, (x,c)) : sT − xTA ≥ 0, (x,c) ∈ U,∣∣∣∣(e−ρtuσ (ν(c)) ,−δzsT + xT (B−δA)− cˆ)∣∣∣∣ ≤ n,}
is closed and is contained in S ′ (t). The same for the set
Γn = {s : (s, (x,c)) ∈ Γnt } ;
5. there exists an admissible strategy with finite value;
6. the set
N (s,U, t) =
{(
e−ρtuσ (ν(c)) + γ,−δzs + xT (B−δA)− cˆ + γ
)
:
(γ, γ) ≤ 0, s− xTA ≥ 0, (x,c) ∈ U}
is convex for all (s,t) ∈ Rn × [0,+∞) ;
7. the set N (s,U, t) has closed graph for each t as a function of s ∈ Γn. Closed graph
means that
sn ∈ Γn,vn ∈ N (s,U, t) , sn → s,vn → v⇒ s ∈ Γn.
8. there exists q′ ∈ Rn+1, q′ ≥ 0 such that for every q ≥ q′ (q = (q0, q1, ..., qn) =
(q0,q1)) there exists locally integrable functions φq and ψq defined for t ∈ [0,+∞)
such that
e−ρtuσ (ν(c)) q0+
(−δzsT + xT (B−δA)− cˆ)q1 ≤ φq (t)+ψq (t)·max [0, sTe1, ..., sTen]
for every (s, (x,c) , t) ∈ S.
9. for every i = 1, ..., n and every admissible state trajectory st, we have s
T
t ei ≥ 0 for
every t ≥ 0. Moreover for every q0∈R, q0 ≥ 0, there exists an integrable function νq0
defined for t ∈ [0,+∞) such that, ,
e−ρtuσ (ν(ct)) (1 + q0) ≤ νq0 (t) ,
for every admissible strategy (x,c) ∈ A (¯s).
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All points 1-4 and 6-7 are easily checked in our case thanks to the linearity of the
state equation and of the constraints. We omit the verification of them for brevity. Point
5 is known from previous results (Proposition 4.5 and Proposition 4.7). Point 9 comes
simply recalling that for σ > 1 the utility is negative and so one can choose νq0 (t) = 0
for every t ≥ 0. Point 8 is more delicate. Setting
g (c) = e−ρtuσ (ν(c)) q0 − cˆTq1
we have
g (c) ≤ 0
Moreover
−δzsT + xT (B−δA) = −δz
(
sT − xTA)+ xT (B−δxA) ≤ xTB.
Now, recalling the proof of (27) we have that
xTB ≤ sTD ≤M max [0, sTe1, ..., sTen]
whereM depends only on the coefficient of D. Setting, for t ≥ 0, φq (t) = 0 and ψq (t) = M
we see that φq and ψq are locally integrable functions and satisfy point 8.
Case σ = 1 and σ ∈ (0, 1).
Also this case goes applying Theorem 22 and note 26 of [19, p. 406] (see also [18] or
[19, Exercise 6.8.3, p.410]). In fact this theorem asks the following:
1. the set U where the controls take values is closed (in our case U is Rm+ ×Rk+ i.e. the
positive orthant of Rm+k);
2. the functions defining the running utility ((s, (x,c) , t) → e−ρtuσ (c)), the dynamics
of the state equation ((s, (x,c) , t)→ −δzsT + xT (B−δA)− cˆ) and the constraints
((s, (x,c) , t)→ sT − xTA) are defined on the set
S =
{
(s, (x,c) , t) ∈ Rn+ × U × R+ : sT − xTA ≥ 0
}
are linear (or sum of linear and nondecreasing) in the variable s and continuous on
the set
S ′ =
{
(s, (x,c) , t) ∈ Rn+ × U × R+ : sT − xTA ≥ 0
}
;
3. for each t ≥ 0 the set
S ′ (t) =
{
(s, (x,c)) ∈ Rn+ × U : sT − xTA ≥ 0
}
is contained in the closure S0 (t) of the set
S0 (t) =
{
(s, (x,c)) ∈ Rn+ × U : sT − xTA > 0
}
;
28
4. for each n ∈ N and t ≥ 0 the set
Γnt =
{
(s, (x,c)) : sT − xTA ≥ 0, (x,c) ∈ U,∣∣∣∣(e−ρtuσ (ν(c)) ,−δzsT + xT (B−δA)− cˆ)∣∣∣∣ ≤ n,}
is closed and is contained in S ′ (t). The same for the set
Γn = {s : (s, (x,c)) ∈ Γnt } ;
5. there exists an admissible strategy with finite value;
6. the set
N (s,U, t) =
{(
e−ρtuσ (ν(c)) + γ,−δzs + xT (B−δA)− cˆT + γ
)
:
(γ, γ) ≤ 0, s− xTA ≥ 0, (x,c) ∈ U}
is convex for all (s,t) ∈ Rn × [0,+∞);
7. the set N (s,U, t) has closed graph for each t as a function of s ∈ Γn. Closed graph
means that
sn ∈ Γn,vn ∈ N (s,U, t) , sn → s,vn → v⇒ s ∈ Γn.
8. there exists q′ ∈ Rn+1, q′ ≥ 0 such that for every q ≥ q′ (q = (q0, q1, ..., qn) =
(q0,q1)) there exists locally integrable functions φq and ψq defined for t ∈ [0,+∞)
such that
e−ρtuσ (ν(c)) q0+
(−δzsT + xT (B−δA)− cˆT )q1 ≤ φq (t)+ψq (t)·max [0, sTe1, ..., sTen]
for every (s, (x,c) , t) ∈ S.
9. for every i = 1, ..., n and every admissible state trajectory st, we have s
T
t ei ≥ 0 for
every t ≥ 0. Moreover for every q0∈R, q0 ≥ 0, there exists an integrable function
νq0 , continuous functions χ
i
q0
and θiq0 (i = 1, ..., n) defined for t ∈ [0,+∞) such that,
for every admissible strategy (x,c) ∈ A (¯s),
e−ρtuσ(ν(ct) (1 + q0) +
n∑
i=1
χiq0 (t)
(−δzsTt + xTt (B−δA)− cˆTt ) ei ≤ νq0 (t) , (51)
and
−
∫ +∞
s
χiq0 (t)
(−δzsTt + xTt (B−δA)− cˆTt ) eidt ≤ θiq0 (s) (52)
where lims→+∞ θiq0 (s) = 0.
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All points 1-4 and 6-7 are easily checked in our case thanks to the linearity of the
state equation and of the constraints. We omit the verification of them for brevity. Point
5 is known from previous results (Proposition 4.5 and Proposition 4.7). Point 8 follows
arguing exactly as in the case σ > 1 except for the estimate of the function g(c) which is
done as follows. First observe that g(c) goes to −∞ as any ci → +∞, then observe that
g is positive on a compact set depending on q and t which is bounded uniformly when q
and t belong to a bounded set. This is enough to guarantee that g has a maximum point
and that the value of the maximum is uniformly bounded for q and t on bounded sets.
Point 9 is more delicate. Take first the case σ ∈ (0, 1). Set, for i = 1, . . . , n, χiq0 (t) =
eTi
(∑k
j=1 v
j
F e
−djt
)
where dj = Γj + ε0 for suitable ε0 to choose later. First consider, in
(51), the terms containing ct. They are
e−ρtuσ(ν(ct)) (1 + q0)−
n∑
i=1
cˆTt eiχ
i
q0
(t) .
Since we have
n∑
i=1
cˆTt eiχ
i
q0
(t) =
k∑
j=1
cTt v
j
F e
−djt ≥
k∑
j=1
cTt eje
−djt
(using Lemma 4.1 to get the last inequality) then, setting
g (t, c) := e−ρtuσ(ν(c)) (1 + q0)−
n∑
i=1
cˆTeiχ
i
q0
(t) .
we have
g (t, c) ≤ e−ρtuσ(ν(c)) (1 + q0)−
k∑
j=1
e−djtcTej.
Setting ωj = e
−djtcTej we have that
e−ρtuσ(ν(c)) (1 + q0)−
k∑
j=1
e−djtcTej = e−ρtuσ(ν(ω1ed1t, . . . , ωkedkt)) (1 + q0)−
k∑
j=1
ωj.
So, calling
g1(t, ω) = e
−ρtuσ(ν(ω1ed1t, . . . , ωkedkt)) (1 + q0)−
k∑
j=1
ωj,
we have
sup
c≥0
g(t, c) ≤ sup
ω≥0
g1(t, ω)
Now, setting ωmax = max{ω1, . . . , ωk}
ν(ω1e
d1t, . . . , ωke
dkt) ≤ ωmaxν(ed1t, . . . , edkt) = ωmaxeε0tν(eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt) = ωmaxeε0tν(eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt)
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So, calling, for ε > 0
Cε = sup
t≥0
{e−(Γν+ε)tν(eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt)} < +∞
we have
ν(ω1e
d1t, . . . , ωke
dkt) ≤ Cεωmaxe(Γν+ε+ε0)t.
It follows
g1(t, ω) ≤ C1−σε ω1−σmax
1 + q0
1− σ e
−[ρ−(Γν+ε+ε0)(1−σ)]t −
k∑
j=1
ωj.
Since
ω1−σmax ≤
k∑
j=1
ω1−σj
we have
g1(t, ω) ≤
k∑
j=1
C1−σε
1 + q0
1− σ e
−[ρ−(Γν+ε+ε0)(1−σ)]tω1−σj − ωj.
The maximum value of the left hand side can be easily calculated and is
σ
1− σC
1
σ
−1
ε (1 + q0)
1
σ e−[ρ−(Γν+ε+ε0)(1−σ)]t
So if we take ε and ε0 such that ρ > (Γν + ε + ε0)(1 − σ) we have integrability of
supc≥0 g(t, c) and so also of g(t, ct) for every admissible consumption strategy ct.
Now consider the terms without ct in (51)
−δzsTt + xTt (B−δA) = −δz
(
sTt − xTt A
)
+ xTt (B−δxA) ≤ xTt (B−δxA) .
Then
n∑
i=1
χiq0 (t)
(−δzsTt + xTt (B−δA)) ei ≤ n∑
i=1
χiq0 (t)
(
xTt (B−δxA)
)
ei =
k∑
j=1
(
xTt (B−δxA)
)
vjF e
−djt
From Lemma 4.1 we have, for every ε > 0(
xTt (B−δxA)
)
vjF e
−djt ≤ xTt AvjF (Γj + ε) e−djt ≤ e(−dj+Γj+ε)ts¯TvjF (Γj + ε) .
So, taking ε < ε0 the first part of point 9 is true.
Now we go to (52) observing that
−
∫ +∞
s
χiq0 (t) ·
(−δzsTt + xTt (B−δA)− cˆTt ) eidt
≤
∫ +∞
s
χiq0 (t) ·
(
δzs
T
t + δxx
T
t A + cˆ
T
t
)
eidt.
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From the estimates (23) and (25) we get, for every j = 1, . . . , k,
eTi v
j
F ·
(
δzs
T
t + δxx
T
t A
)
ei ≤ (δz + δx) sTt vjF ≤ (δz + δx) s¯TvjF e(Γj+ε)t
so that ∫ +∞
s
χiq0 (t) ·
(
δzs
T
t + δxx
T
t A
)
eidt ≤ e
−(ε0−ε)s
ε0 − ε (δz + δx)
k∑
j=1
s¯TvjF ,
which goes to zero as t → +∞ if ε < ε0. Finally, arguing as above, thanks to (23)-(26)
we get, for ε < ε0 ∫ +∞
s
χiq0 (t) · cˆTt eidt ≤ e−(ε0−ε)s
k∑
j=1
s¯TvjF
and this completes the proof.
Case σ = 1. The proof of (52) and of the estimate for the part not containing c of
(52) is the same as in the case σ ∈ (0, 1). Concerning the remaining estimate we set
g (t, c) := e−ρt log(ν(c)) (1 + q0)−
n∑
i=1
cˆTeiχ
i
q0
(t) .
Again we observe that
sup
c≥0
g(t, c) ≤ sup
ω≥0
g1(t, ω)
where
g1(t, ω) = e
−ρt log(ν(ω1ed1t, . . . , ωkedkt)) (1 + q0)−
k∑
j=1
ωj,
and, arguing as above we get
g1(t, ω) ≤ e−ρt (1 + q0) log(Cεωmaxe(Γν+ε+ε0)t)−
k∑
j=1
ωj,
and from now on we estimate g1(t, ω) as above getting the claim.
5 Appendix
In this Appendix we study the limit
lim
t→+∞
e−Γνtν
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)
=: Lν , (53)
First of all we prove the following result.
Proposition 5.1 Assume that the law of ν contains a finite number of sums, products,
powers and min operation. Then L ∈ (0,+∞).
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Proof. We prove the result by induction on the number of elementary operations (sums,
products, power, min). If there is only one elementary operation the claim is obvious.
Assume now that the the claim is true when ν is done by n elementary operations. Consider
then ν with the law done by n+ 1 elementary operations. This means, in particular, that
we can write, either
ν(c) = f(ν1(c), ν2(c)) ∀c ∈ Rk+,
where f(a, b) = a+ b, ab, a ∧ b and ν1, ν2 are done by n elementary operations; or
ν(c) = [ν0(c)]
α ∀c ∈ Rk+,
for some α ∈ R− {0} and ν0 done by n elementary operations.
First case: f(a, b) = a+ b. In this case we have
lim
t→+∞
e−Γνtν
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)
= lim
t→+∞
e−Γνt
[
ν1
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)
+ ν2
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)]
By the positivity of ν1, ν2 we have
lim
t→+∞
e−Γνtν1
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)
+ lim
t→+∞
e−Γνtν2
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)
and the same when we substitute Γν with Γν ± ε. So we have
Γν = Γν1 ∨ Γν2 .
So we must have either Lν = Lν1 , or Lν = Lν2 , or Lν = Lν1 + Lν2 .
Second case: f(a, b) = ab. In this case we have that both ν1, ν2 must be homogeneous
of constant degree η and 1− η, respectively. Then
ν1 · ν2 =
[
ν
1/η
1
]η
·
[
ν
1/(1−η)
2
]1−η
=: ν¯η1 · ν¯1−η2
Moreover arguing as above we observe that it must be
Γν = ηΓν¯1 + (1− η)Γν¯2
so
lim
t→+∞
e−Γνtν
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)
= lim
t→+∞
[
e−Γν¯1 tν¯1
(
eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt
)]η·[e−Γν¯2 tν2 (eΓ1t, . . . , eΓkt)]1−η
and the claim follows as in the first case.
Third case: f(a, b) = a ∧ b. One argues as in the first case using that here
Γν = Γν1 ∧ Γν2 .
So we must have Lν = Lν1 ∧ Lν2 .
Fourth case: the power. One argues as in the second case.
Now we provide two examples where L = 0 and L = +∞.
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Example 5.2 Let k = 2 and let {αi}i∈N be a sequence such that αi ∈ (0, 1) for every
i ∈ N and limi→+∞ αi = 0. Assume that 0 < Γ1 < Γ2 and let
ν(c1, c2) =
+∞∑
i=1
cαi1 c
1−αi
2
It is easy to check that Γν = Γ2 and that L = 0.
Example 5.3 Let k = 2 and let αi = 1− 1i+1 for i ∈ N. Assume that 0 < Γ1 < Γ2 and let
ν(c1, c2) = inf
i∈N
{
icαi1 c
1−αi
2
}
It is easy to check that Γν = Γ1 and that L = +∞.
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